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THE BEYOND THE BORDER ACTION
PLAN: A TOOL FOR ENHANCED
CANADA-U.S. COOPERATION ON
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND
CYBER SECURITY - OR MORE
WINDOW DRESSING?
By William de Laat
While there is ample recognition in both countries of the deep
integration of the Canadian and American economies, our mutual
reliance on an intricate web of interconnected physical and cyber
infrastructure is often overlooked. With few exceptions, governments
and the private sector have a limited understanding of the complex
interdependencies between these shared systems and networks, and
the enormous economic fallout that can result from major
infrastructure failures.
Canada and the United States have made only modest progress to
date in addressing issues related to their shared critical infrastructures
and cyber systems. Neither country has devoted sufficient resources
nor shown a sustained commitment to making shared infrastructures
more resilient and less vulnerable to failure or attack.
Both governments have been slow to put in place effective policies
and procedures to anticipate, manage, and recover from major crossborder infrastructure disruptions. Joint initiatives in the Beyond the
Border Action Plan ("BTBAP")' and the Canada-United States
Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure ("CUSCI"),2 have not been
given priority by senior officials in either country and have failed to
set out a coherent set of deliverables, deadlines, and accountabilities.
This, in turn, has left private sector stakeholders to fend largely for
themselves, with little direction from government.
William de Laat is currently an International Security and Government
Relations Consultant at De Laat Global Strategic Consulting. Prior to
this, he served as Counsellor in the Public Safety and Border Security
division at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
1.

BEYOND THE BORDER: A SHARED VISION FOR PERIMETER SECURITY AND

ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS (2011), available at http://www.white

house.gov/sites/default/files/us-canada-btb-action
[hereinafter BTB.
2.

plan3.pdf

CANADA-UNITED STATES ACTION PLAN FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

(2010), available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ci/fl/cnus-ctpln-eng.pdf [hereinafter CUSCI].
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Canada and the United States should address these issues as a
top priority immediately after the 2012 United States presidential
elections. By moving aggressively to identify gaps and vulnerabilities,
and to agree on remedial measures to protect their joint systems and
networks, they will not only be protecting their respective economic
and security interests, but they could also become important models
for international cooperation in this area. In the global rush to
determine cyber security standards, Canada, in particular, should
ramp up its game, or it might well face the bleak prospect of being
left out in the cold while the United States and other global players
move ahead without them.'
CONTEXT

At the outset, I wish to stress that the views and opinions
expressed here are strictly my own. I recognize that a short article
like this can provide only a quick and incomplete picture of CanadaUnited States relations in critical infrastructure protection and cyber
security. My purpose in writing this article is to suggest where there
might be opportunities for making more rapid progress and to identify
some possible gaps and weaknesses in our current approach.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND CYBER SECURITY AS
PRIORITY ISSUES FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Sometimes the terms critical infrastructure and cyber security are

confused and misunderstood even by the public policy makers
responsible for them. It is a truism to point out that networks,
systems, and information flows have become the lifeblood of the
global economy. But few seem to be aware that almost all business,
economic, and even personal information now exists in digital form.
The implications of this fact are staggering.
And so, the links between infrastructure protection, cyber
security, and trade are unmistakable. As President Obama recently
stated, "Amnerica's economic prosperity in the 21st century will
depend on cyber security."' Another expert report put it this way:
3.

See generally, e.g., Ottawa Needs to Improve Cyber Security: Auditor
General, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 23, 2012, 7:30 PM), http://www.
theglobeandmail.com/commentary/editorials/ottawa-needs-to-improvecyber-security-auditor-general/article4632711/
(discussing
Canada's
need to improve its cyber security standards and to place a higher
profile on efforts to do so).

4.

Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec'y, The White House, Remarks by
the President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber Infrastructure (May 29,
2009)(on file with author), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/remarks-president-securing-our-nations-cyber-infrastructure.
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The U.S. has developed more than most other nations as a
modern society heavily dependent on electronics, telecommunications,
energy, information networks, and a rich set of financial and
transportation systems that leverage modern technology. This
asymmetry is a source of substantial economic, industrial, and societal
advantages,
but
it
creates
vulnerabilities
and
critical
interdependencies that are potentially disastrous to the United
States.5
Stand-alone critical infrastructure, unconnected to the Internet or
other large computer networks, is almost non-existent today.
In a Canada-United States context, these networks and systemsbe they computer networks, electric power grids, pipelines,
transportation and logistics networks, or supply chains-together
form the essential underpinnings of an immense and highly prosperous
North American economy. Andrew Graham, a Canadian policy
commentator, underlines this convergence of cyber systems and
critical infrastructure: "the interdependence of critical CI systems is
developing an overlay of what might be called the meta-CI system,
cybernetics and computer control systems that control . . . systems

such as energy, transportation, finance, and others."'
It seems that not a day goes by without increasingly alarming
reports of intrusions and disruptions of banking systems or
government networks. This is remarkable, given that back issues of

the Canada-UnitedStates Law Journal, for example, reveal almost no
references to critical infrastructure or cyber security until a couple of
years ago.' Major disruptions or failures of critical infrastructure have
never really loomed large in the public psyche, and as a result, these
issues were never at the forefront of public policy. Today, however,
growing public and business concern about the potential economic

5.

JOHN S. FOSTER, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE
THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)

ATTACK 2 (2004), available at http://www.empcommission.org/docs/
empc exec-rpt.pdf.
6.

ANDREW GRAHAM, MACDONALD-LAURIER INST., CANADA'S
INFRASTRUCTURE: WHEN IS SAFE ENOUGH SAFE ENOUGH?

CRITICAL
2 (2011),

available at http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/Canadas-Critical-

Infrastructure-When-is-safe-enough-safe-enough-December-2011.pdf.
7.

See Carmine Marcello, Keynote Luncheon Address II: Keynote Address,
36 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 114 (2012); see also Stephen E. Flynn, The New
Reality in Canada/U.S. Relations: Reconciling Security and Economic
Interests and the Smart Border Declaration,29 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 9 (2003);
see also Theodore C. Theofrastous, Security and the Economy: The
North American Computer and Communication Infrastructure,29 CAN.U.S. L.J. 225 (2003).
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impacts of infrastructure disruptions is becoming a compelling driver
for speeding up joint work between our two countries in this area.,
Another indication of growing policy interest in cyber security is
found in a survey of a large cross-section of global public policy
leaders conducted by the Security and Defence Agenda of Brussels,
Belgium.9 Here are some of the survey's key findings:
* Forty-five percent of respondents said cyber security is now as
important as border security."
* Forty-three percent of respondents identified damage or
disruption to critical infrastructure and its potential economic
impact as the greatest single threat posed by cyber attacks."
* Fifty-seven percent of respondents believed an arms race is
taking place in cyberspace.12
* Thirty-six percent of respondents said cyber security is more
important than missile defence.' 3
* The cyber-readiness of the United States, Canada, Australia,
United Kingdom, China, and Germany, all lagged behind
smaller nations like Israel, Sweden, and Finland, among the
twenty-three countries rated by report."
As a result, critical infrastructure protection, and to an even
greater extent, cyber security, have become increasingly important
public policy priorities.' This not only creates enormous opportunities
8.

See, e.g.,

9.

See BRIGID GRAUMAN, SEC. & DEF. AGENDA, CYBER SECURITY: THE
VEXED
QUESTION
OF
GLOBAL
RULES
(2012),
available at
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-sda-cyber-security.pdf.

10.

Id. at 47.

11.

Id.

12.

Id.

13.

Id.

14.

See generally id. at 51-85.

15.

See, e.g., CONF. BD., PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: A CROSS-

AUD. GEN. OF CAN., CHAPTER 3: PROTECTING CANADIAN
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AGAINST CYBER THREATS, FALL REPORT OF
THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA (2012), available at http://www.oagbvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parloag_201210_03 e.pdf.

BORDER ACTION PLAN (2009), available at http://issuu.com/emergencysolutionsintl/docs/cross#download; see also, e.g., PUB. POL'Y FORUM,
CYBER-SECURITY: DEVELOPING A CANADIAN STRATEGY (2008), available
at
http://old.ppforum.ca/common/assets/publications/fr/20085161235
12.pdf.
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for ramping up our work on these issues, but it also poses major
challenges and raises expectations of those responsible for managing
them.
If these were easy issues, they would have been solved a decade
ago. But there really are no easy solutions or "low-hanging fruit" here.
Critical infrastructure and cyber security issues are difficult to grapple
with. They are complex and constantly changing. Added to this
complexity is the fact that none of these networks or infrastructures
falls exclusively within the public safety, law enforcement,
intelligence, or trade domains. This lack of clear accountabilities and
a poor understanding by many policy makers of the complex issues at
play have made policy development slow and cumbersome. To make
things even messier, these infrastructure set are more often controlled
by the private sector or provincial and state players than by federal
government so.
A

BRIEF REVIEW OF CANADA-UNITED

STATES

COLLABORATION ON CYBER SECURITY AND CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE

The United States and Canada have had a long history of
collaboration on critical infrastructure, emergency management, and
defence issues.16 It is instructive to reflect on how our joint work on
critical infrastructure and cyber security has evolved, particularly
since September 11, 2001. Before the 1990s, the term infrastructure
was usually synonymous with public works (bridges, canals, etc.) or
information systems. After September 11, however, the policy debate
shifted from infrastructure adequacy to physical and cyber
infrastructure protection, and then more recently, to infrastructure

resilience.
For all its hoopla, and, as many have said, waste of time and
energy, Y2K was an important first step by Canada and the United
States in working together to secure vital computer and
telecommunications networks. That work brought about close
collaboration across all sectors of the economy, innovative new forms
of public-private sector cooperation, and for the first time in a crossborder setting, a serious assessment of the potential interdependencies
and cascading effects that failures in one sector could have on others.
The work plans associated with Y2K were rigorous, with contingency
plans developed for almost everything that might go wrong." The
16.

See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. & PUB. SAFETY CAN.,
COMPENDIUM OF U.S.-CANADA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE

MECHANISMS

(2012),

available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/

ns/ci/_fl/cuc-emam-eng.pdf.
17.

See, e.g., Lance B. Eliot, Y2K Late-Date Solution: Business
Contingency Planning, 30 DEC. LINE 13, 13-14 (2009), available at
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entire effort had a strong economic focus and enjoyed sustained highlevel political support.s
It also marked the tentative beginning of a new global awareness
of these issues. An International Y2K Cooperation Centre" was
established at the behest of national Y2K coordinators from over 120
countries when they met at the First Global Meeting of National Y2K
Coordinators at the United Nations in December 1988." The World
Bank provided funding.2 0 The Centre's mission was to "promote
increased strategic cooperation and action among governments,
peoples, and the private sector to minimize adverse Y2K effects on
the global society and economy. "21
Though the problem at hand at that time was more static and
less complex than the ones we face in dealing with critical
infrastructure and cyber security today, Y2K did drive our two
countries to establish joint steering committees and several privatepublic sector working groups to address a similar, common threat.22
Whether the investment of money and energy was ultimately
warranted may never be known, but it did lay the groundwork for
future cooperation.
Issues related to critical infrastructure protection took on added
urgency after the September 11 attacks, though differences between
Canada and the United States over the justification for invading Iraq
and Canada's refusal to join the "coalition of the willing" put a
significant damper on Canada-United States security relations. 23 The
http://www.decisionsciences.org/DecisionLine/Vol30/30-1/info30_1.pd
f (discussing methods for drafting contingency plans for different
potential scenarios as a result of Y2K).
18.

See, e.g., U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., YEAR 2000 COMPUTING CRISIS:
BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING (1998), available at

http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/bcpguide.pdf.
8

INT'L Y2K COOPERATION CTR.,

http://www.iy2kcc.org/

(last visited

Dec. 16, 2012).
19.

See

Elisabeth

Cooperation

Kaplan

et

Center

Records

al.,

Historical Note,

1998-2000,

International Y2K

UNIV.

http://special.lib.umn.edu/findaid/xml/cbi00153.xml
16, 2012).

OF

MINN.,

(last visited Dec.

20.

See id.

21.

Id.

22.

See generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., THE ECONOMICS OF Y2K AND THE
IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES (1999), available at http://www.esa.

doc.gov/sites/default/files/reports/documents/y2k_1.pdf
(discussing
various joint-initiatives the United States had with Canada to minimize
the adverse effects and costs of Y2K).
23.

See generally THOMAS S. AXWORTHY, CAN. DEF. & FOREIGN AFF. INST.,
UNWILLING TO BE WILLING: THE PRIMACY AND CAPABILITY PRINCIPLES IN
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"Patriot Act" 24 and the unhelpful "good versus evil" and "you're
either with us or against us" positioning of the Bush Administration
caused concerns among many Canadians about the potential impact
that new United States security arrangements would have on
Canadian sovereignty and values, especially personal privacy.25
At the time I took up my position as Counsellor for Public Safety
and Border Security at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
in 2003, relations between the two countries were markedly cool.
However, due to the personal energy and drive of Homeland Security
Secretary Tom Ridge and Deputy Prime Minister John Manley, joint
work between the two countries moved forward under the Smart
Border Accord.26 This served to underscore the important role that
personal relationships and direct involvement of senior leaders can
have in addressing joint security and economic issues, even in the face
of prickly bilateral relations.
Action Item 21 of the Smart Border Accord required the
American and Canadian Governments to "[c]onduct binational threat
assessments on trans-border infrastructure and identify necessary
additional protection measures, and initiate assessments for
transportation networks and other critical infrastructure."2 Joint
assessments were carried out in several sectors, including pipelines,
electricity and transportation. 28
In 2001, the two governments agreed on a Joint Framework for

Canada-United States

Cooperation on

Critical Infrastructure

Protectionwith a bi-national Steering Committee, to assess threats to
"shared critical infrastructure and ensure an ongoing, high-level focus
on the issue by both governments." The Steering Committee created
RELATIONS (2003), available at http://www.cdfai.
org/PDF/Unwilling%20To%2OBe%2OWilling.pdf (discussing the effect
that Canada's refusal to join the "coalition of the willing" had on
Canada-United States relations).
CANADIAN-AMERICAN

24.

USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).

25.

See, e.g., TREAS. BD. OF CAN. SEC., PRIVACY MATTERS: THE FEDERAL
STRATEGY TO ADDRESS CONCERNS ABOUT THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND
TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS (2006), available at http://www.tbssct.gc.ca/pubs pol/gospubs/TBM_128/pm-prp/pm-prp-eng.asp.

26.

THE CANADA-U.S. SMART BORDER DECLARATION: ACTION PLAN FOR
CREATING A SECURE AND SMART BORDER (2001),
available at

http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071213014139/http:

//www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/actionplan-en.asp.
27.

Id. at Item 21.

28.

See, e.g., FOREIGN AFF. & INT'L TRADE CAN., SMART BORDER ACTION
PLAN STATUS REPORT (2004), available at http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20051229033040/http://www.dfait.gc.ca/can-

am/main/border/status-en.asp [hereinafter STATUS REPORT].
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working groups to draw up detailed work plans for collaboration in
the areas of energy, telecommunications and transportation. A
committee on cyber security was added later. The Steering
Committee also established working groups "to address horizontal
issues such as research and development, interdependencies, mapping
and threat information sharing."29
This joint work on critical infrastructure was aided by the
creation in Canada of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection
and Emergency Management,"0 and in the United States, of the Office
of Homeland Security in the White House.' Both were well placed
strategically to ensure that there would be a high-level focus on
critical infrastructure, including cyber security issues.
Another important milestone was the signing in 2004 of an
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Canada for Cooperation in Science and
Technology for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Border
Security. 32 But despite the momentum created by September 11, these
efforts eventually faltered, due mainly to a series of reorganizations
involving senior staff changes in both countries and a renewed focus
by both governments on domestic infrastructure priorities.
The 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnershipof North America"

initiative made renewed attempts to address these issues and some
limited progress was made, including the exchange of best practices,
participation in joint exercises, and establishing mechanisms for
coordinating emergency response and mutual assistance; yet, these
29.

See Policy Framework,Gov'T OF CAN., http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/
sources/infrastructure/1563 (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).

30.

CAN.,
CRITICAL
SAFETY
e.g.,
MICHEL ROSSIGNOL, PUB.
See,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (2001),

available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection-R/LoPBdP/
BP/prbOl7-e.htm

(discussing the creation of the Office

of Critical

Infrastructure and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) in February
2001).
31.

See, e.g., OFF. OF HOMELAND SEC., THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY iv, 13, 47 (2002), available at
(discussing
http://www.ncs.gov/library/policy-docs/nat-strat-hls.pdf
the creation of the White House Office of Homeland Security on October
8, 2001 and its purported mandate).

32.

Agreement for Cooperation in Science and Technology for Critical
Infrastructure Protection and Border Security, U.S.-Can., June 1, 2004,
T.I.A.S. No. 04-601[hereinafter Science and Technology Agreement].

33.

SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA (2005),

available at http://www.spp-psp.gc.ca/eic/site/spp-psp.nsf/eng/000
57.html (a non-binding, information sharing initiative between the
United States, Canada and Mexico, with a goal to increase both security
and prosperity among the three nations).
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were largely ad hoc activities, and not part of any comprehensive
strategy.
However, cross-border work did continue in a few key sectors and
geographic regions. The electricity sector, primarily as a result of
fallout from the massive 2003 Northeast Blackout,34 carried out joint
work in identifying, assessing, and remediating vulnerabilities
affecting the electrical grid, developed common reliability standards,
and began work on cyber security standards." Significant progress
was also made in the transportation and broader energy sectors (oil
and gas)," as well as at the regional level through organizations like
the Pacific Northwest Economic Region.3 1 In addition, several
province-state partnerships were launched, including one involving
Ontario and Michigan," which have conducted joint exercises- related
to critical infrastructure in border areas.
During this period, both countries also continued to work together
multilaterally in organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ("NATO"), 9 the G8,40 the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation ("APEC"), 4' and the Organization of American States

34.

See, e.g., J. R. Minkel, The 2003 Northeast Blackout-Five Years Later,
Sci. AM. (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.
cfm?id=2003-blackout-five-years-later.

35.

See STATUS REPORT, supra note 28; see also U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
U.S.-CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE
AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA:
CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(2004),

available at https://reports.

energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf.
36.

See STATUS REPORT, supra note 28.

37.

PAC. Nw. EcON. REG., http://www.pnwer.org/
2012).

38.

See, e.g., CAN.-U.S.-ONT.-MICH. BORDER TRANSP. P'SHIP, DETROIT
RIVER INTERNATIONAL CROSSING STUDY (2008), available at http://www.

(last visited Dec. 16,

partnershipborderstudy.com/pdf/EA-Report/EA Chapterl.pdf
(discussing the work of the Canada-U.S.-Ontario-Michigan Border
Transportation Partnership, which consists of the United States Federal
Highway Administration, Transport Canada, the Ontario Ministry of
Transportation, and the Michigan Department of Transportation).
39.

N. ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
index.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).

40.

See, e.g., Canada's G8 Website, Gov'T OF CAN., http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/index.aspx?view=d (last visited Dec. 16, 2012).

41.

ASIA-PAC. ECON. COOPERATION, http://www.apec.org/ (last visited Dec.
16, 2012).
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("OAS"),4 2 to raise awareness and encourage national governments to
step up their work in these areas.
Again, though some progress was made, it was difficult to sustain.
Neither Canada nor the United States appeared willing to invest the
time, energy, or resources needed to keep the momentum going, and
neither side had effective champions to take ownership of these issues.
One public commentator summed up the Canadian situation as
follows:
In the heady days after the 2001 tragedies, the federal
government asserted a leadership role in protecting CI in
Canada. What has emerged over the past 10 years, however,
would appear to be little real progress . . . Seen from the

outside, the efforts over that period had a stop-start quality,
with more plans to plan than actual changes or results."
Regarding joint Canada-United States activity during this period,
the same commentator asked:
[Dloes all of this activity with its array of committees,
communications, and sharing of information actually constitute
action? . . . While these efforts to build stronger ties are

commendable and probably absolutely necessary, they are
hardly the desired end state. What that state might look like
remains unarticulated.44
WHAT EXACTLY DOES THE BEYOND THE BORDER ACTION

PLAN COMMIT

GOVERNMENTS TO

Do?

So will the critical infrastructure and cyber security initiatives in
Part IV of the BTBAP 45 help accelerate joint activities between
Canada and the United States? Not likely in any significant way. In
fact, it is surprising that after almost ten years of cooperation
between Canada and the United States on these issues, there are still
so few specific details (the section dealing with critical infrastructure
and cyber security contains fewer concrete, new commitments than
almost any other component of the plan). 46
Let's have a look at some of the key elements in the plan that the
two governments have committed themselves to:
42.

ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp
Dec. 16, 2012).

43.

GRAHAM, supra note 6, at 19.

44.

Id. at 20.

45.

See BTB, supra note 1, at 23-25.

46.

See id.
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"Execute programs and develop joint products to enhance crossborder critical infrastructure protection and resilience."47
This is largely a promise to make good on the CUSCI announced
back in 2010.8 Had this commitment been fleshed out in greater
detail in the BTB and included clear deadlines and deliverables, it
might have signaled a renewed commitment to action. But it is not.
"[C]onduct a regional resilience assessment program (RRAP) for
the Maine-New Brunswick region . . . ."4

While regional initiatives can contribute significantly to enhanced
Canada-United States resilience, there are higher priority issues that
need to be addressed, first at the level of bi-national leads.
"[C]reate binational mechanisms for joint risk analysis, which
will share information and develop joint analytic products.""o
While this activity holds promise, such mechanisms and products
already exist. Is some new, more intensive effort being proposed?
"[E]nhance our already strong bilateral cyber security
cooperation to better protect vital government and critical
digital infrastructure and increase both countries' ability to
respond jointly and effectively to cyber incidents. This will be
achieved through joint projects and operational efforts,
including joint briefings with the private sector and other
stakeholders and the enhancement of real-time information
sharing between operation centres."'
It is not at all clear what this commits governments to in specific
terms.
"Expand joint leadership on international cyber security
efforts"52 and "strengthen cooperation on international cyber
security and Internet governance issues . ... ."5
Again, while this is a laudatory objective, it is a vague commitment
lacking in specifics.

47.

Id. at 23.

48.

See CUSCI, supra note 2.

49.

BTB, supra note 1, at 23.

50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 24.

53.

Id.
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In summary, there is little in the way of new, meaningful joint
activity on critical infrastructure and cyber security in the BTB.
So WHERE SHOULD WE

Go FROM HERE?

In order to sustain joint efforts, Canada and the United States
must immediately develop an ambitious, comprehensive, bi-national
plan, setting out in detail how the two nations will work together to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from cyber and critical
infrastructure threats and disruptions. This should be fleshed out over
the coming six-to-twelve months and finalized in detail within the
next two years at the latest. To be effective, the plan should include
both cyber security (cyber systems and networks) and critical
infrastructure (especially cyber-supported critical infrastructures). " It
could perhaps take the form of a single plan with two annexes. This
work should be closely coordinated with the law enforcement"5 and
trade6 sections in the BTBAP.
This initiative will require dedicated resources and a recognition
that participants will have to devote significant time outside of their
day-to-day responsibilities to complete this work; there is no way
around this. Governments are either committed to producing results
or they are not. It should include ambitious, explicit actions, establish
accountabilities, include expected results and rigorous timelines for
each action item, including a clear designation of which individuals or
agencies will be leading and supporting the effort, and what they are
each expected to deliver and by when. There should be robust
reporting requirements and mechanisms for tracking results.
The plan should focus on a number of key priorities," each of
which should set out bold objectives and deliverables. The plan
should be reviewed semi-annually by a small, bi-national steering
group of senior officials, and reviewed annually by Ministers/Cabinet
Secretaries. A report to the general public and stakeholders should be
made following each annual review. Possible priorities might include
any number of the following:
54.

Both issues, for the most part, are currently dealt with in isolation by
both governments. See, e.g., CUSCI, supra note 2 (discussing critical
infrastructure but making no specific mention of cyber security).

55.

See BTB, supra note 1, at 21.

56.

See id. at 11-19.

57.

Such priorities could be identified jointly by a small group of senior
officials from both countries in a one day facilitated retreat using simple
SWOT (Strengths/Weaknesses/Opportunities/Threats) analysis. See,
e.g., Tim Berry, How to Perform SWOT Analysis, BPLANS.COM,
http://articles.bplans.com/business/how-to-perform-swot-analysis/116
(last visited Dec. 16, 2012).
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1. Develop a systematic, long-term agreement or protocol
between Canada and the United States for identifying, sharing,
and protecting cyber security and critical infrastructure
information, and set specific modalities and mechanisms for
doing so."
2. Prepare a mutual agreement or protocol setting out clear
roles and responsibilities of departments and agencies in each
critical
and
security
cyber
country involved in joint
infrastructure activities. Clarify, in particular, the roles of public
safety/security departments, defence border, law enforcement
and intelligence agencies. Sort out the complex jumble of roles
for
various
and competing interests. Designate lead agencies
activities.
3. Develop a detailed concept of operations (CONOPS)"
setting out rules of engagement for joint operational activities."o
58.

A good beginning already exists. See CUSCI, supra note 2 (committing
Canada and the United States to coordinate alerts and certain
information products). More needs to be done, however, to determine:
(1) information that is available; (2) the constraints that exist in sharing
different types of information across the border and with the private
sector; and (3) the mechanisms and procedures that need to be put in
place. There are numerous examples of such detailed informationsharing agreements in other spheres, such as immigration. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Off. of the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S.Canada Visa and Immigration Information-Sharing Agreement (Dec. 14,
at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/
available
2012),
202065.htm.

59.

A concept of operations (CONOPS) is a description of how a set of
capabilities should be employed to achieve desired objectives or a
desired end state. It should describe processes to be followed and a clear
methodology to realize the goals and objectives of the system. In
general, it will include the following:
1. Statement of the goals and objectives of the system;
2. Strategies, tactics, policies, and constraints affecting the
system;
3. Organizations, activities, and interactions among participants
and stakeholders;
4. Clear statement of responsibilities and authorities delegated;
5. Specific operational processes for fielding the system; and
6. Processes for initiating, developing, maintaining, and retiring
the system.
See, e.g., WMO, STANDARD OUTLINE FOR DOCUMENTATION OF GOOD
PRACTICES IN MULTI-HAZARD EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS 2 (2009),
available at
http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/drr/events/MHEWSII/Documents/Doc-5-FINALEWSDocumentationTemplate.pdf.
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The multi-faceted nature of critical infrastructure systems
points to the urgent need for a clearly defined modus operandi
involving many stakeholders interacting across borders in
complex ways, and yet operating as an integrated system. The
CONOPS should govern operational linkages between Public
Safety Canada and Department of Homeland Security
operations centres, the ("CERTS"),' law enforcement, defence
and intelligence agencies, private sector players, and states and
provinces. It could also include provisions for staff exchanges,
joint training, and exercises. Governments should set a bold
objective to achieve this, --for example: "by 2015 the United
States and Canada will achieve full joint operating capabilities
in cyber security as set out in a comprehensive joint concept of
operations, to be completed by June 2014. The concept of
operations will include the following specific elements ('xyz'),
and will take the form of a formal agreement between both
parties to be signed at the level of Cabinet Secretary/Minister,"
etc.
4. Create a robust joint analytical capability dedicated to
policy analysis in priority areas such as legal frameworks,
regulatory options, standards
development,
identity
management, personal privacy, and data protection. Develop a
framework for joint research and development priorities. This
could perhaps be done under the auspices
of
the
existing
Agreement Between the Government of Canada
and
the
Government of the United States of America for Cooperation in
Science and Technology for Critical Infrastructure Protection
and Border Security.62
5. Jointly develop a private sector engagement strategy setting
out a formal consultative process with sectors, resulting in a
clarification of roles and expectations for private sector
involvement in cyber security and infrastructure
protection.
This is not an optional activity. The private sector must be
drawn in from the beginning.

60.

Joint operational activities could include, both bilateral and multilateral
watch and warning efforts; intrusion detection; incident management;
forensics; investigations and response; threat assessment; risk analysis;
training and staff exchanges; joint exercises; and, information protection
and dissemination.

61.

Otherwise known as "Computer Emergency Response Centers."

62.

See Science and Technology Agreement, supra note 32.
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6. Develop a paper setting out options for possible joint "Five
Eyes,"" European Union, NATO, and other multilateral
engagements.
7. Undertake an immediate stock-taking of cyber security
standards by sector and require critical infrastructure sectors to
prepare voluntary or mandatory cyber security standards within
a set timeframe.
8.Finally, and perhaps most importantly, identify senior
champions to steer and drive the collaboration process and to
hold people accountable for results.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
1. Are the goals in the BTBAP detailed and challenging enough
States
to significantly deepen and intensify Canada-United
cooperation on these issues? What key, concrete deliverables are
missing?
2. Are these goals attainable within a reasonable timeframe,
given the differences in governance, legislation, policy, and capacity
that exist between Canada and the United States in many of these
areas?
3. Does each nation have its own house sufficiently in order to
allow it to commit the energy and resources necessary to achieve
these joint goals? Will domestic considerations or simply lack of
interest prevent the United States from devoting serious attention to
bilateral activities with Canada? Note for example the intense,
ongoing debate in the U.S. over proposed legislative/executive action
related to cyber security standards. Do bilateral relations stand a
chance of succeeding in such an environment?
4. Timing is everything. Canada, in particular, should use the
hiatus in American activity resulting from pending decisions on
legislative mandates to further refine its positions on issues like
privacy, voluntary versus mandatory standards, and international
standards development. This will be crucial if joint Canada-United
States activities are to keep pace with the sizzling rate of
international developments.
5. What is the ultimate end game of cooperation for the United
States and for Canada? Is it policy, legislative, and operational

63.

"Five Eyes" is a term used to describe the intelligence alliance between
the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom. See, e.g., Kady O'Malley, Do the "Five Eyes" Watch Each
Other?, CBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
inside-politics-blog/2012/10/from-the-order-paper-question-archives-do-

the-five-eyes-watch-each-other.html.
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convergence, or is it something less than that? What are the
alternatives?
6. Is there the political will, not just in Canada and the United
States, but internationally, to address the contentious issues of data
protection and personal privacy rights?' This is particularly relevant
in light of strong reactions in Canada to the provisions of the
Canadian Government's online surveillance Bill C-3065 and reactions
immediately following September 11 to the privacy implications of the
"Patriot Act" in the United States."' It is also reflected in the recent
heated debate in the United States over an expanded domestic cyber
security role for the National Security Agency," in the European
Union's plans to bolster data protection rights for individuals,, and in
the public debate over data protection under cloud computing.65
64.

65.

See, e.g., Rick Mercer, Rick's Rant-Online Privacy, CBC PLAYER (Feb.
21, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/player/Shows/Shows/The+Rick+Mercer
+Report/Rick%27s+Rants/ID/2200235120/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2012)
(depicting a "slightly over the top" discussion that sums up the
reactions of many Canadians about intrusions into personal privacy).
See, e.g., Heather Mallick, Op-Ed., Conservative Bill C-30 Will Let
Police Spy on Canadians Online, TORONTO STAR (Feb. 14, 2012),
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/article/1131446-conservative-bill-c-30-will-let-police-spy-on-canadians-online.

66.

See, e.g., PatriotAct Seen as Threat to Canadians' Privacy, CBC NEWS
(June 20, 2006, 2:10 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2006/
06/20/privacy-report.html.

67.

See, e.g., Mark M. Jaycox, Why the NSA Can't Be Trusted to Run U.S.
Cybersecurity Programs, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 30, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/07/why-nsa-cant-be-trusted-run-uscybersecurity-programs.

68.

See, e.g., Press Release, European
Commission Proposes a
Comprehensive Reform of Data Protection Rules to Increase Users'
Control of their Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses (Jan. 25, 2012),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-12-46_en.htm?
locale=en.

69.

See, e.g., Michael Chertoff, Op-Ed., Cloud Computing and the Looming
Global Privacy Battle, WASH. PoST (Feb. 9, 2012), http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2012-02-09/opinions/35444049_1 data-privacycloud-storage-data-protection ("A set of global rules will be difficult to
achieve. International structures are notoriously cumbersome and slow
moving; this is a particular challenge in the context of quickly
developing cloud
technology.
And international
organizations'
governance structures are often universally inclusive, which means that
countries with little interest in Internet freedom or accessibility may
have a disproportionate influence on

the rules adopted. . . . The

alternative, however, is equally problematic. If development of privacy
rules and regulations is left to individual countries, one of three
scenarios is likely to result: Heralded by E.U. actions, more fragmented
regulation may emerge as non-European countries try to impose their
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7. Is the Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Canada on Emergency
Management Cooperation, 0 with its relatively recent involvement and
lack of bench strength on critical infrastructure and cyber security
issues, really the vehicle best suited to serve as the "cornerstone" of
these joint efforts?
8.How effectively does this plan address the important question of
cooperation between the United States and Canada at a global level?"
What are the respective roles of bilateral relations with trusted
partners, like-minded groups like "Five Eyes", the European Union,
and various other multilateral organizations? Will Canada and the
United States attempt to arrive at common positions on the
development of international standards and protocols in these areas?72
At a minimum, will they undertake to consult or advise each other
prior to taking major new positions in multilateral forums?
9.Finally, the BTB commits the Canadian and American
Governments to enhancing the resiliency of shared critical and cyber
infrastructure. But are the two nations still placing too much
emphasis on threats and vulnerabilities and not enough on how we
own privacy views on an unruly network. . . . Another possibility is a
rush to the bottom as countries compete to attract commercial cloud
services by minimizing privacy protections. . . . The most likely result,

however, is a privacy clash as the United States and the European
Union compete to impose their will. This is the worst possible outcome,
pitting natural allies against each other. U.S. diplomacy should urgently
focus on dissuading Europe from unilateral action while developing a
comprehensive 'Western' approach to cloud privacy.").
70.

Agreement on Emergency Management Cooperation, U.S.-Can., Dec. 12,
2008, T.I.A.S. No. 2010-0071.

71.

See generally, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-606,
CYBERSPACE: UNITED STATES FACES CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING
GLOBAL CYBER SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE (2010) (discussing key

international organizations involved in cyber security and the challenges
that the United States faces in the area of international cyber security
arrangements; yet, no reference is made to bilateral arrangements, such
as with Canada).
72.

Canada has had, and continues to have, a close strategic alliance with
the other "Five Eyes" nations-United States, United Kingdom,
Australia, and New Zealand-on signals intelligence, dating back to the
1940s. It is therefore somewhat surprising that recent collaboration

between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia on a
trilateral initiative to fund new research and development for improved
cyber security has not included Canada. See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of
the Press Sec'y, The White House, Joint Fact Sheet: U.S.-UK Progress
Towards a Freer and More Secure Cyberspace (Mar. 14, 2012), available
at
http://www.uspolicy.be/headline/white-house-us-uk-cybersecuritypartnership.
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deal with the actual consequences of a major failure or attack? What
specific activities do they have in mind for developing more resilient
joint response and recovery capabilities?
In conclusion, while the commitments made in the BTBAP may
ultimately lead in the right direction, they are a rather timid
collection of ad hoc, ongoing activities that will do little to galvanize
players on either side of the border.
Canada and the United States need to do some serious soulsearching-and quickly-about the desired end state and specific joint
actions they will commit themselves to in the areas of Cyber security
and critical infrastructure protection if they are to take full advantage
of the important window of opportunity the BTBAP provides.
POSTSCRIPT

This article was written in Fall 2012, at a time when efforts to
address these issues appeared to be floundering on both sides of the
border. Efforts to date had been largely perfunctory and half-hearted.
As this goes to print, however, governments and legislators in both
countries seem seized with the importance of making these issues
domestic policy priorities. Only time will tell, however, whether
governments are serious about tackling them as important bilateral
priorities.
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